University of Delhi 2008 M.B.A Faculty of Management Studies (FMS) - Question Paper

move freely in more abstract and inferential realms. every open
concept can be embedded in a theoretical matrix or network
from which its meaning is derived through its relations with
other open concepts, with only indirect reference to explicit
observables. The disadvantage is that open concepts may
become so circuitous in their references that they become
tautological and completely decoupled from observables. No
doubt clarity gets muddled and deductions become
tautological in statements such as “in the borderline the
mechanisms of the ego disintegrate when libidinous energies
overwhelm superego introjections.” In such formulations, the
scope of a theory overwhelms the testability of its empirical
linkages, rendering precision zero.
Due to simple pragmatism, all scientific models, being
simplifications of nature, must reach a compromise ranging from
scope and precision. We are not yet mystics at the beginning of
a science : Unlike the individually borne thinking in a
taxonomy which carves nature at its joints, we are acutely
conscious that the relations among our naive representations
are not those intrinsic to the subject domain itself. No one
today would seriously put Hippocrates’s humoral theory
forward as a model of personality syndromes. Instead, such
formulations resemble the more or less unrefined and often
self-contradictory knowledge of commonsense than the wellcriticized
and well-corroborated knowledge of science. As
disputable as common sense is, it is nevertheless the point of
departure for scientific knowledge and a source of common
sense taxonomies.
On an individual level, what distinguishes these 2 broad
approaches? What does every individual scientist do to carry
out his or her approach? Evidently, the theoretical approach is
driven primarily by taking perspective on sense-near
representations in order to discover underlying theoreticcausal
relations from which a more coherent, internally
corroborating system of constructs might be established. New
constructs are generated, “more or less removed from the level
of directly observable things and events.” a few old ones are
discarded, while others have their meaning sharpened or
transformed as the system of relations is made more explicit.
A process of reflection seems essential. Such representations
are referred to as theoretical constructs, to reinforce their
abstract origins in the mind of a reflective scientists.
Empiricism, however, tends to keep close to sense-near

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